Oral Argument Schedule / Recordings

Whether and to what extent the Arizona Department of Administration may recover, under A.R.S. § 12-962, the cost of medical care provided to participants in the state health insurance plan for injuries sustained as a result of third-party tort liability when the participants received compensation from that third party.

2. Did the trial court properly enter summary judgment in favor of VISA on the merchant’s claim of negligent misrepresentation despite the merchant’s allegations that VISA had made additional oral representations concerning the contract?

2. Did the appellant waive its argument that “acquisition of information in an employment appeal cannot occur during executive session” when the appellant failed to raise this argument in the superior court and never challenged the validity of the executive session pursuant to A.R.S. § 38-431.07?

Did the trial court err in overturning, as arbitrary and capricious, the City Director of Procurement’s decision that the City was entitled to assess liquidated damages against a contractor for late performance, and, as a result, in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the contractor?

Did the trial court err by concluding that plaintiff Nancy Andrews had not raised an issue of material fact concerning causation and by granting summary judgment to defendant Corona Electric as a result?

2) Whether the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment because § 20-259.01 contains a safe-harbor provision which immunizes insurance companies from litigation when they provide insureds offer forms approved by the Department of Insurance.

3) Whether the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because questions of fact existed as to whether plaintiff knowingly declined UM\UIM coverage.

2) Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in deciding not to report the juveniles’ adjudications to MVD.

2. Did trial court err by declining to give two jury instructions requested by plaintiff: one intended to cure the alleged error regarding fault of subsequent-treating physician and a second instruction on liability for subsequent harm?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Bellinfante’s motion to amend his complaint, which he filed after judgment had been entered against him?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it granted summary judgment in favor of Falconer on her claim that Bellinfante wrongfully recorded a mechanic’s lien and when it awarded Falconer her attorney fees incurred in litigating that claim?

2. Do the court’s jury instructions require reversal of the defendant’s conviction?

2. Does the surreptitious recording by one spouse of a telephone call between spouses qualify for protection under the marital communications privilege? If so, does the exception allowing a spouse to be examined as a witness in cases where the other spouse is being prosecuted for, inter alia, dangerous crimes against children, apply to the marital communications privilege as well as the marital fact privilege?

Whether this court has jurisdiction to address DPC’s appeal from the trial court’s orders: 1) granting partial judgment in favor of Parsons; 2) denying DPC’s motion for new trial; and 3) bifurcating the trials of the easement-related issues from the water-rights related issues.

DPC v. The Walkers

1) Whether the trial court erred in: 1) dismissing DPC’s cross-claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation against the Walkers as time barred; 2) granting summary judgment in the Walkers’ favor on DPC’s cross-claims of breach of contract and breach of warranty; and 3) granting summary judgment in favor of the Walkers on their claims against DPC for negligent misrepresentation and fraud-in-the-inducement.

Alternatively, are the students covered parties for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy and, therefore, entitled to the benefits of the underinsured motorist provision pursuant to § 29-259.01(B)?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering the father to pay one half of the mother’s attorney fees and in holding him solely responsible for guardian ad litem fees incurred by daughter?

2. Whether the trial court erred in holding appellants’ notice of claim provided insufficient facts under § 12-821.01(A) to notify the County of their claim of inverse condemnation.

3. Whether the Federal or Arizona Constitutions bar application of § 12-821.01 to claims for inverse condemnation.

(2) Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the City of Coolidge on Jonovich’s alternative claim that the City was unjustly enriched by Jonovich’s repair of the defective construction, on the basis of the court’s finding that the original contract between the City and Jonovich as a matter of law was not invalid and had not been modified.

(2) Did the mandatory consecutive sentences required here by A.R.S. § 13-705 amount to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by article II, § 15 of the Arizona Constitution?

(3) Does § 13-705 violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection by punishing the possession of child pornography more severely than other dangerous crimes against children that are committed directly against children?

Specifically, did the court err by determining:

1) the growers of crops raised in Mexico were “located” in Washington, D.C., for purposes of perfection pursuant to A.R.S. § 47-9307(C);

2) Del Monte did not have a “right of recoupment” pursuant to A.R.S. § 47-9404; and

3) A.R.S. §§ 47-9610 and 47-9615 did not preclude Del Monte’s liability for conversion?

Did the trial court err in denying Gariby’s discovery request for documents related to a different proceeding involving the same model of child seat?

Did the court err in determining further that appellee had a valid first-position mechanic’s lien on the property?

Did the trial court err by awarding attorney fees to the trustee?

2. Whether the superior court erred in determining appellants failed to meet either standard?

3. If appellants failed to comply with the referendum filing requirements, can such noncompliance be excused by appellants’ use of the petition form provided by the City Clerk?

Did the trial court reversibly err by closing appellants’ trial to all members of the public except the press without making any specific findings or considering any less restrictive alternatives?

ADDITIONAL ISSUE SUMMARY IN STATE OF ARIZONA v. ANDRE LAVELLE ARMSTRONG CR 2011-0391:

Did the trial court err in denying Armstrong’s motions for a judgment of acquittal on charges of conspiracy and misuse of body armor?

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Armstrong’s motions to sever his trial from that of his codefendants?

2) Did the trial court err in concluding an issue of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was a “recreational user” of the golf course under the statute, thus precluding entry of summary judgment?